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ROYAL HOLLOWAY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
POPULAR ACCOUNTING HISTORY:
EVIDENCE FROM POST-ENRON 
STORIES
Abstract: This study reviews the concept of “popular history” in the 
context of accounting history, drawing on evidence from post-Enron 
stories about corporate collapse and accounting and auditing failure.  
The study complements the work of Carnegie and Napier [2010], 
which focused on how professional accountants and their firms 
and organizations were portrayed in books about Enron and Arthur  
Andersen that were published during the period 2002 to 2005.  These 
books can be characterized as “popular histories”, and the present  
paper illustrates how the scholarly work of academic accounting 
historians is given little attention by the authors of these post-Enron 
stories.  It points to the largely untapped potential for accounting 
historians to make their research findings and insights available for a 
general readership.
INTRODUCTION
The reputation of the international accounting profession 
suffered badly from the dramatic collapse of Enron in 2001, 
accompanied by financial and accounting scandals involving 
companies such as WorldCom in the United States of America 
(USA), HIH in Australia and Equitable Life Assurance Society 
in the United Kingdom (UK). This collapse in the profession’s 
reputation was exemplified by the demise of Arthur Andersen, 
previously one of the “Big Five” international accounting firms, 
in 2002. The impact of the Enron collapse on stereotypical views 
of accountants and accounting was studied by Carnegie and 
Napier [2010], who focused on the ways in which professional 
accountants, firms and organizations were portrayed in the large 
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number of books on the collapse of Enron and other major corpo-
rations published in the period 2002-2005. That study identified 
three themes for which the post-Enron literature provided in-
sights: how accountants were represented as characters, whether 
authors considered accounting to be a profession or more like 
an industry, and the extent to which the Enron affair provided 
evidence that accountants were no longer honest and trustworthy.
Carnegie and Napier [2010, p. 370] observed that some of 
the authors whose work they analyzed had used historical mate-
rial and arguments. They identified authors’ use of a contrast be-
tween “then” and “now” (with possible overtones of nostalgia for 
a “golden age” of professional probity), as well as the employ-
ment of a narrative trope “old sins cast long shadows”, where 
authors suggested that the failure of Andersen in particular was 
rooted in that firm’s early embrace of consulting as an extension 
of its audit practice. The use of historical arguments in studies 
written for a general readership is interesting in that authors, 
who are typically not accountants, appear to believe that their 
readership will find such arguments cogent rather than irrel-
evant. This suggests that there is a general concern with history 
on the part of the readers of popular management narratives, 
which may provide opportunities for historians of accounting to 
communicate their knowledge to broader audiences.
In this study, we examine the use of accounting history in 
post-Enron stories, and use this as the basis for considering ref-
erences to accounting in popular history more generally. We ex-
plore how commentators have drawn on the history of account-
ing to portray accountants and their work and to contrast the 
personalities of “founding fathers” of the US accounting profes-
sion with their early 21st-century successors.  Our investigation 
starts from the books about Enron and Arthur Andersen that 
were published during the period 2002 to 2005 (see Carnegie 
and Napier [2010, p. 367] for a list of the 28 books examined), 
although only 12 of these books refer to accounting or auditing 
from a historical perspective.  We seek an enhanced understand-
ing of how accounting history is drawn upon in commenting 
on the corporate and professional failures themselves and on 
their implications, for example for the future of the accounting 
profession. We begin with a brief discussion of the concepts of 
“public history” and “popular history”, and then outline the col-
lapse of Enron and the demise of Arthur Andersen. This is fol-
lowed by a consideration of the use of history in the post-Enron 
narratives, from which we draw some conclusions about the 
need for historians of accounting to disseminate their research 
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findings in popular as well as academic forums.
PUBLIC AND POPULAR HISTORY
Professional historians are increasingly reflecting on the 
relevance of their studies to the concerns of the public at large 
[Champion, 2007]. This comes as a reaction to public interest 
in history, whether expressed as a demand for historical fiction, 
of which recent noteworthy examples are the award-winning 
novels Wolf Hall and Bring Up The Bodies by Hilary Mantel 
[2009, 2012] about the Tudor politician Thomas Cromwell, or 
as an interest in what is taught as history in schools [Cannadine 
et al., 2011]. Sir Richard Evans, the Regius Professor of History 
at Cambridge University, has observed the growing demand for 
novels, films, television series, and “blockbuster history books”, 
noting that “historians today are communicating with far larger 
audiences when they broadcast on radio or television” [Evans, 
2002, p. 14]. In 1979, the National Council for Public History 
(NCPH) was established in the USA to provide a focus for histo-
rians wishing to emphasize the public profile of history [Howe, 
1989]. “Public history”, as promulgated through channels such 
as the NCPH’s journal, The Public Historian, is seen as taking 
history outside the classroom and the academy and promoting 
the relevance of history within the public sphere. As Tosh [2008, 
p. 100] notes, “public history” ranges from “historical work car-
ried out in conjunction with museums and other heritage bod-
ies” to “everything that professional historians do to bring their 
work to public attention – through journalism, TV programmes 
or policy advice.”
Tosh [2008, p. 100] draws a distinction between “profes-
sional and lay history”, and he identifies the move towards 
public history as mainly driven by professional historians. Howe 
[1989] suggests that the public history movement in the USA 
reflected an expansion in the number of professional historians 
at a time when university recruitment in history departments 
was growing much more slowly. “Public history” allowed career 
paths to be defined for historians outside schools and universi-
ties. Tosh’s reference to “lay history” acknowledges that history 
may be written by those who do so as a hobby or avocation, and 
by those without an academic training as a historian, as well as 
by those who make their living from teaching and researching 
history. Many of the early historians of accounting, such as the 
bibliophile Karl Kheil [Napier, 2009, p. 33] were “lay historians”.
Public history overlaps with, but is not synonymous with, 
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“popular history”. Although the latter term originally referred to 
the history of “ordinary people”, in contrast with “elite history” 
(the history of rulers and aristocrats – see Cannadine [2008: pp. 
30-31]), popular history now tends to imply history aimed at 
a wide or general readership or (as popular history frequently 
takes the form of television series) audience.  It tends to empha-
size broad narrative sweeps while at the same time using “tell-
ing” detail to illustrate particular points. For example, a popular 
history of a wartime battle may interleave discussions of grand 
strategy with extracts from interviews with, or memoirs of, 
soldiers involved in the actual fighting. Popular historians value 
readability [Curthoys and McGrath, 2011]: their books often 
have a similar physical appearance (with the possible excep-
tion of illustrations and maps) to novels, with an absence of the 
scholarly “apparatus” of footnotes and references that would 
reveal the author’s sources. This has led some historiographers 
(for example, Curthoys and Docker [2006]; Southgate [2009]) to 
debate at length how, if at all, history and fiction are distinct.
This is not to claim that popular history is unscholarly. To 
the contrary, many of those associated with widely watched TV 
programmes or best-selling books are academics highly respect-
ed by their peers for their scholarship (Bell and Gray [2007]; 
Beck [2011]). However, popular history can be distinguished al-
most at sight from academic history, as its raison d’être lies in its 
appeal to the interests and appreciation of the general “consum-
er” rather than those of professional historians.  As Champion 
[2003, p. 155] puts it: “Both historians and documentary film-
makers aim at achieving an engagement with the truth of the 
past: they simply have different methods and instruments for 
getting there.” Champion was writing about the series A History 
of Britain, broadcast originally by the BBC between 2000 and 
2002 and written and presented by the eminent art and cultural 
historian Simon Schama. Champion [2003, p. 172] sums up this 
popular history series by describing it as:
[A] powerful document representing the “truth” of past 
events in a particular form, from a particular point 
of view. However much we might dispute specific ele-
ments, or even the overall narrative plot, nevertheless 
to engage with the drama, the details and the power of 
the story, provides the imaginative audience with ample 
food for historical thought. The best history can do no 
more.
Some popular historians are without academic affiliation, 
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while others are academics or former academics who write for 
a general audience. For example, the prominent British media 
personality David Starkey,1 who has written and presented sev-
eral television history series, usually on the Tudor period, was a 
highly respected academic historian based at the London School 
of Economics for some 30 years before leaving to concentrate 
on a lucrative media career. It is not uncommon for popular 
historians to have experience as current or former journalists 
[Lowe, 2012].
Popular historians often use historical accounts that already 
exist, such as official histories or general histories. In this way, 
they are like historical novelists, who need to ensure that, when-
ever their stories refer to events that “actually happened”, they 
at least appear to be “true to the facts”. For example, the histori-
cal novelist Robert Goddard, whose novel The Ways of the World 
[2013] is set during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, states in 
an author’s note that: “Real people, places and events have been 
depicted as accurately as possible”. Goddard cites, as one of his 
main sources, Margaret MacMillan’s Peacemakers [2003]. Mac-
Millan is a professional historian, and her account is at the same 
time rigorously scholarly and popular – the book was a best-sell-
er and won the Samuel Johnson prize, the UK’s most prestigious 
non-fiction book award. Popular historians who come from an 
academic background are also likely to distil their histories from 
journal articles and even from primary sources. Hence, there is 
no reason to assume that, simply because historians write for a 
readership extending beyond other historians, their work will 
lack rigor. Although some “professional” historians disdain their 
more “popular” colleagues, many of the latter group ably meet 
the challenge of reconciling scholarship with popular appeal.
While professional historians may grudgingly tolerate their 
colleagues when they address a popular audience, “lay” popular 
historians are disliked or even despised by some academic histo-
rians, who regard them as “hacks” rather than original scholars. 
For example, the American documentary film producer Ken 
Burns, most famous for the Public Broadcasting System’s series 
The Civil War, first broadcast in 1990, has described himself as 
“a popular amateur historian” (quoted in Southgate [2005, p. 
138]). Burns has been accused of “reduc[ing] history to ‘a mind-
softening, saccharine-like substitute’, appealing to the emotions 
and pandering to the lowest common denominator of people’s 
taste for nostalgia” (quoted in Southgate [2005, p. 139]). As Tosh 
1  Often described as “the rudest man in Britain” [Cooke, 2012].
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[2010, p. 13] notes more generally:
Professional historians insist on a lengthy immersion in 
the primary sources, a deliberate shedding of present-
day assumptions, and a rare degree of empathy and 
imagination. Popular historical knowledge, on the other 
hand, tends to a highly selective interest in the remains 
of the past, is shot through with present-day assump-
tions, and is only incidentally concerned to understand 
the past on its own terms.
Professional historians fear that historical evidence will be used 
selectively to advance agendas; for example, Hawke [2011, p. 14] 
warns that “bringing historical knowledge to bear on current is-
sues is different from mining the past for convenient arguments”.
Such discussions and debates have arisen in the historical 
accounting literature. For instance, Carnegie [2006] suggested 
that accounting historians may widen the relevance of their 
work by writing, on occasions, for a general readership, such as 
on the perennial topic of corporate collapse and accounting fail-
ure. In response, Radcliffe [2006] argued that Carnegie [2006] 
was in effect proposing entry to a forbidden arena. Radcliffe 
seemed to perceive no role for accounting historians in provid-
ing a historical appreciation to the general public, including 
modern-day investors, creditors and other financial statement 
users, by placing a spotlight on the interplay of corporate and 
accounting failure across time. Accounting historians, however, 
despite the recent call for a greater awareness of the public and 
popular roles of history made by Gomes et al. [2011], do not typ-
ically prepare and publish popular works on accounting’s past. 
This leaves a gap that can be exploited by “lay” historians, and a 
recent example of a prominent popular history in accounting is 
the book Double Entry: How the Merchants of Venice Shaped the 
Modern World – and How their Invention could Make or Break the 
Planet by the art historian Jane Gleeson-White [2011].
Gleeson-White’s book stresses the importance of double-
entry bookkeeping in providing the commercial technology 
upon which trade, industry and capitalism itself developed. She 
writes at length about Luca Pacioli and his first printed treatise 
on double-entry, discusses the “Sombart Thesis” about the rela-
tionship between double-entry and the rise of capitalism, looks 
at how double-entry underpins national income accounting, 
touches briefly on Enron and other contemporary scandals, and 
concludes by noting that the long-term future of the planet may 
depend on how well accountants capture the full economic, so-
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cial and environmental costs of the resources we use. The book 
synthesizes wide, but selective, reading. It contains references 
and a bibliography at the end, the main text being presented 
with very few “academic” signs (merely some use of indented 
block quotations and a few figures). Some aspects of the book 
are particularly commendable – the coverage of national income 
accounting gives prominence to an aspect often overlooked by 
historians of accounting (but see Napier [1996, pp. 467-468]; 
Suzuki [2003]). However, reviewers have identified problems 
with both Gleeson-White’s general narrative [Soll, 2012] and 
her detailed appreciation of the emergence of double-entry and 
the work of Pacioli [Sangster, 2012]. In addition, Gleeson-White 
often relies on a small number of sources, typically secondary 
rather than primary – for example, she notes [2011, p. 267] that 
her discussion of Enron draws on an article in the Guardian2 by 
Anna Pha [2002] and a section of Niall Ferguson’s The Ascent of 
Money: A Financial History of the World [2008], incidentally a 
book linked to a “popular history” television series broadcast by 
Channel 4 in the UK in 2008.3
The main themes addressed by Gleeson-White – double-
entry, Luca Pacioli, the rise of capitalism, the emergence, devel-
opment and possible decline of the accounting profession, and 
corporate scandal – are clearly perceived to interest the general 
reader, and we would expect popular histories of accounting to 
address similar themes. Before examining how accounting his-
tory has been mobilized by the writers of popular post-Enron 
stories, we remind readers of the main events surrounding the 
collapse of Enron (and the demise of Arthur Andersen).
ENRON AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN
Enron was founded in 1985 by Kenneth Lay as a natural gas 
pipelines company. It diversified into electricity, coal, plastics 
and other industries, including telecommunications bandwidth 
trading. It gained a reputation as a high-performing stock and 
was noted for regularly exceeding earnings expectations and for 
its remarkably strong share price performance. By the end of the 
2  This is not the newspaper based in London but rather a publication of the 
Communist Party of Australia. Gleeson-White [2011, p. 194] misquotes Enron’s 
sales in 1996 as having been US$2.3 billion, whereas her source gives the sales as 
US$13.2 billion.
3  Ferguson himself drew all his material for the section of his book about En-
ron [Ferguson, 2008, pp. 169-175] from the studies of McLean and Elkind [2003] 
and Swartz [2003].
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1990s, Enron had become one of the largest and most prominent 
corporations in the USA. However, unknown to investors, Enron 
had established a set of off-balance sheet special purpose entities 
(SPEs). Large debts were accumulated in these off-balance sheet 
entities, which were controlled by the Chief Financial Officer, 
Andy Fastow, allowing the corporation to sustain an appearance 
of strong financial performance and hence achieving flourish-
ing share price growth. Enron also traded with these SPEs, thus 
allowing for a significant amount of earnings manipulation. 
Enron’s underlying financial position and performance, how-
ever, was deteriorating, resulting in major write offs occurring in 
quarterly financial statements issued in October 2001. Six weeks 
later, in November 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy. 
Following the Enron collapse, it emerged that Enron’s audi-
tors, the international professional services firm Arthur Ander-
sen, had begun to shred reams of Enron audit working papers, 
casting doubts as to the quality of the firm’s auditing and the 
firm’s overall integrity. Andersen also provided substantial ad-
visory and consultancy services (in terms of fee income, Enron 
was one of Andersen’s largest clients), which generated more in-
come than the regular audit work. This blurred the boundaries 
between auditing and consulting and raised strong doubts (at 
least after the event) about the independence of the audit firm. 
The SPEs, which were deployed by Enron to mask the underly-
ing financial performance and position of the corporation, had 
been approved by Andersen as legitimate off-balance sheet enti-
ties. The fallout from the Enron document shredding led to the 
firm temporarily losing its licence from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to undertake audits of quoted entities in the 
USA. Andersen was also associated with other contemporaneous 
accounting scandals, including WorldCom and Sunbeam. Many 
other clients, rather than standing by the firm, began to believe 
that having Andersen as their auditor would be regarded nega-
tively by stakeholders. The dramatic loss of Andersen’s reputa-
tion led rapidly to the firm’s extraordinary demise. Never before 
had the failure of a major corporation in the USA resulted in the 
collapse of one of the most prominent international professional 
services firms. The accounting profession was suddenly in tur-
moil, possibly facing the biggest crisis in its history.
POST-ENRON BOOKS: HISTORIES AND CONTRASTS
When journalists touch on the history of accounting and 
auditing, the two most frequently named historical figures are 
8
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Luca Pacioli and Arthur Andersen. Pacioli’s name gained par-
ticular prominence around 1994, when the 500th anniversary 
of the publication of his Summa de Arithmetica brought double-
entry well into the public arena for a short time. His fame was 
reinforced by the popular accounting software “Pacioli 2000”, 
an entry-level DOS-based package that was launched in 1991, 
became one of the most widely used accounting packages in the 
USA, but was discontinued in the early 2000s. Arthur Andersen’s 
name was probably better known than those of the founders 
of other international accounting firms partly because the firm 
used its founder’s full name as late as 2001, and because Arthur 
E. Andersen himself died only in 1947, whereas the eponyms of 
other firms were generally figures of the 19th century. Particu-
larly insightful in this regard is Berenson [2004], who was writ-
ing at the time as a financial investigative reporter for The New 
York Times. Berenson [2004, p. 23] claims:
Despite its importance to capitalism, accounting exists 
almost in a vacuum. Its past has hardly been studied; 
historians have inexplicably focused on Napoleon and 
Stalin instead of Arthur Andersen and Luca Pacioli, the 
Italian monk who in the late 1400s wrote Summa, the 
first treatise on bookkeeping. 
In the books under review, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Andersen appears most often as a character, but Pacioli is not 
entirely overlooked.  Such contributions in the aftermath of 
the collapse of Enron may be identified as the “after Pacioli, 
came Andersen” view of accounting history.  Berenson’s lack of 
familiarity with the long-established and ever-growing scholarly 
literature on accounting history is evident in his comment that 
accounting’s past “has hardly been studied”.
Another author, Bryce, specifically warns his readers that 
he is providing “a bit of history” [Bryce, 2003, p. 61]. Bryce 
acknowledges the long history of accounting in stating “It’s [En-
ron] the biggest scandal to ever hit accounting, the world’s sec-
ond oldest profession” [2003, p. 6; emphasis added].  He claims 
that “modern accounting methods . . . started with a Franciscan 
friar, Frater Luca Bartolomes Pacioli, who believed that Re-
naissance businessmen needed a reliable way to assess their 
financial condition. . . . His answer was dual-entry accounting 
. . . [known as] the ‘Italian method’” [2003, p. 61]. Pacioli is used 
by Bryce to personify traditional accrual accounting, in contrast 
to Enron’s extensive use of mark-to-market accounting, the 
adoption of which is regarded by Bryce as “one of the seeds of 
9
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Enron’s destruction” [2003, p. 66]. Bryce’s rapid leap from Paci-
oli to the 1990s, thereby bypassing Andersen, is a good example 
of what Zan [1994, p. 257] has referred to as the “after Pacioli, 
nothing” tendency in the use of accounting history (though Zan 
was strictly referring to non-Italian histories of Italian account-
ing). According to Bryce [2003, p. 379], “there are several biog-
raphies of Pacioli. Much of my information on him came from 
the web site of the Association of Chartered Accountants in the 
U.S.”4
In introducing Pacioli, Brewster [2003, p. 31] claims “the 
roughly one thousand years between the end of the Roman Em-
pire and the rise of great merchant houses in fourteenth-century 
Italy was known as a period of accounting stagnation”. Pacioli, 
who is identified by Brewster as “the father of accounting . . . 
was the most effective dabbler in accounting the world has ever 
seen” [2003, p. 31]. Pacioli’s main areas of interest in math-
ematics and theology are identified and his “famous treatise on 
accounting” is outlined. Double-entry bookkeeping, otherwise 
identified by Brewster as “the Italian system” or the “Venetian 
method”, is described “as the equivalent of the printing press in 
publishing” [2003, p. 31]. Brewster relates Pacioli’s 1494 treatise 
on double-entry bookkeeping to contemporary events in stating 
“its application was so significant in terms of the efficiency and 
the clarity it introduced that it became the standard throughout 
the West and is still the basic model for businesses today” [2003, 
p. 31].
Although most of the authors of the books reviewed con-
sider themselves chroniclers of contemporary events, several of 
the books were explicitly written as histories. The dust-jacket of 
the Brewster [2003] book notes that the author “traces the pro-
fession from its birth in the Middle East, to its rise as one of the 
most universally respected in the Western world, to the calami-
tous scandals of the past two years, to the fall of Andersen and 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Squires et al. [2003, p. 
xiv] comment in their Preface that readers “will understand the 
long chain of events that eventually caused Andersen to fall.”5 
The outside back cover of Berenson [2004] states “with wit and 
a broad historical perspective, Berenson puts Enron, WorldCom 
4  Bryce [2003, p. 379] refers to the web page www.acaus.org/history, but this 
link no longer works. The document to which Bryce refers is a paper entitled “His-
tory of Accounting” by John R. Alexander, which can be accessed at: http://www.
acaus.org/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=825456&module_id=39138.
5  Both these books have attracted reviews in the journal Accounting History 
[Carnegie, 2005a, 2005b].
10
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and the other accounting disasters of recent years in devastating 
context”. 
Journalist writers aim to provide a narrative and chronol-
ogy of the events leading up to, and the aftermath of, their 
chosen corporate collapse, but often go outside their strict “time 
line” to provide historical material on the origins of Andersen 
and more generally on the US accounting profession. This some-
times appears as mere dabbling. Fox, for example, devotes only 
11 lines to her historical sketch of the origins and development 
of Andersen [Fox, 2003, p. 181], and references her source as the 
Andersen website. McLean and Elkind are more generous with 
about six paragraphs on the history of Andersen [McLean and 
Elkind, 2003, pp. 143-145]. As these authors do not provide ref-
erences, it is not possible to be definite about their sources, but 
their history is a slightly enlarged version of that offered by Fox. 
Eichenwald [2005, p. 427] notes that “Andersen had a storied 
history”, but does not expand on this. Jeter [2003, pp. 207-208] 
uses some of the same anecdotes, referencing a BBC Money Pro-
gramme documentary on Andersen broadcast in 2002.6
This relative lack of interest in the history of Andersen is 
not a consequence of a shortage of source material. The firm 
had self-published a number of historical reviews over the years 
[Arthur Andersen & Co., 1974, 1988] alongside a collection of 
Arthur E. Andersen’s speeches and writings [Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 1970], and the extensive reminiscences of Leonard Spacek, 
a later chairman of Arthur Andersen, had also been published in 
book form [Spacek, 1989]. The two Andersen insider accounts 
[Squires et al., 2003; Toffler, 2003] draw heavily, if uncritically, 
from these sources, which, like others of the genre, have a pro-
pensity to present flattering accounts of past events and accom-
plishments [Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 24]. Relying on such 
official historical reviews and acknowledging the role of senti-
ment may have contributed to the making of certain simplistic 
statements by these authors such as the following: “For 89 years, 
Arthur Andersen was a mainstay of the accounting profession 
holding a reputation for honesty and trustworthiness” [Squires 
et al., 2003, p. 10]. 
Brewster [2003] offers apparently the widest knowledge of 
6  This documentary, broadcast on BBC Two on 23 July 2002 under the title 
“No Accounting for Greed”, introduced a UK angle to the Andersen story by dis-
cussing Andersen’s involvement with the collapse of the DeLorean car company 
in 1983. This led to the firm’s being banned from public sector advisory work in 
Britain, a ban that continued until the election of a Labour government in 1997. 
See also Hughes [2002].
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historical accounting research, though even he uses a limited 
number of sources. These include official histories of account-
ing firms, the general histories of Previts and Merino [1998] and 
Chatfield and Vangermeersch [1996] and the historical account 
of Olson [1982], who served as chief staff officer of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which deals with the 
relatively short 1969-1980 period. Brewster also draws heavily 
on archival material in the PricewaterhouseCoopers collection 
at Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library, 
most notably for correspondence by George O. May.7 Brewster 
uses oral evidence obtained from interviews with some 45 peo-
ple, including an interview with an eminent accounting histo-
rian, Stephen Zeff of Rice University. Berenson [2004] also em-
ploys a limited number of sources, including the general history 
of Previts and Merino [1998] and the studies of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Carey [1969, 1970]. 
Berenson further draws upon the historical resources of Stevens 
[1981, 1991] in examining changes in the accounting profession 
since the early 1980s from the perspective of the Big Eight and 
the Big Six accounting firms respectively. Skeel [2005], whose 
book sets the Enron collapse in the context of other US scan-
dals, utilizes the business history literature, but his accounting-
related sources are the same set of official firm histories used by 
other authors.8 
More generally, most authors were clearly unacquainted 
with the accounting history literature in preparing their vol-
umes. Some authors touch on episodes in business or economic 
history, such as the Dutch Tulip Mania, the South Sea Bubble 
and the Wall Street Crash. For instance, Hamilton and Mick-
lethwait [2006, pp. 9-11], who employ the subtitle “the lessons 
from recent disasters”, devote a mere two pages in the introduc-
tion to “the recent past” as “a tale of boom and bust” [p. 9], but 
do not refer to accounting history or to any relevant contribu-
tions in this field based on their references. Overall, very little 
reliance was placed by authors on the available general histories 
of accounting.
The general motivation for the use of history is to provide 
7   Brewster [2003, p. 7] goes so far as to describe May as one of “the giants of 
early-twentieth century U.S. accounting firms”.
8  Arnold and McCartney [2003] have pointed out the extent to which writers 
using historical material in their arguments often refer uncritically to the same 
limited number of sources (see Funnell [2007] for a reply to such criticisms). 
Sometimes, subsequent writers will assume that a single incident narrated by a 
source applies more generally in different contexts.
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a contrast between accounting and auditing (in general) and 
Andersen (in particular) in the earlier years of the 20th century 
and the late 1990s. Not only had the stereotypical accountant 
changed, but so had the public accounting firm. With its head-
quarters in Chicago, “Andersen embodied Midwestern level-
headedness and probity” [Berenson, 2004, p. 113]. Repeatedly, 
writers mention the original Andersen motto “think straight, 
talk straight”, and quote Arthur Andersen’s reaction to a corpo-
rate president who wanted him to endorse a manipulated finan-
cial report. Andersen’s reply was: “There is not enough money in 
the city of Chicago to induce me to change the report” [Squires 
et al., 2003, p. 32, citing Arthur Andersen & Co., 1974; McLean 
and Elkind, 2003, p. 144]. Both Toffler [2003, p. 15] and Skeel 
[2005, p. 103] view the collapse of the business of financier 
Samuel Insull during the 1930s as the Enron of its day, and sug-
gest that Arthur Andersen, as a person of unbending integrity, 
would not have been seduced by temptation at Enron. Follow-
ing the death of Arthur Andersen, the firm’s founder “took on a 
mythical stature” as the firm began to celebrate his life and val-
ues [Squires et al., 2003, p. 37].  By the 1990s, Andersen’s “new, 
unstated motto became ‘Make it Work’. . . . Give the client what 
he wanted” [Swartz, 2003, p. 95].
Carnegie and Napier [2010, p. 370] suggested that the 
authors are making a rhetorical contrast between “then” and 
“now”, with an implied “golden age” of ethical auditing in the 
early 20th century being contrasted with a more mercenary age 
at the beginning of the 21st century. This is particularly evident 
in the way in which Skeel [2005, p. 166] contrasts Arthur E. An-
dersen’s work on sorting out the collapsed Insull empire in the 
1930s with the behaviour of his modern successors: 
The Arthur Andersen who sorted through the wreckage 
of Samuel Insull’s empire prided himself on unflinch-
ing, uncompromising investigation of the companies he 
audited.  The Arthur Andersen auditors who held their 
noses and signed off on the Enron and WorldCom fi-
nancial statements were another breed altogether. 
Berenson [2004, p. 119; emphasis in original] makes a simi-
lar contrast in respect to what were then the Big Six firms as a 
whole:
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Big Six were no lon-
ger accounting firms that happened to have consulting 
units; they were professional services organizations, 
using audits as a way to sell consulting and tax advice.  
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. . . They were partnerships in name only. In reality, 
they were multinational companies, run from the top 
down by partners who called themselves chief execu-
tives and chairmen, not managing partners. The change 
was profound. Accountants had never lived up to their 
lofty rhetoric, but before the 1980s they at least had 
seen themselves as public servants. No longer. 
Paradoxically, the more things change, the more they stay 
the same – plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Just as Carn-
egie and Napier [2010, p. 370] identified a common narrative 
trope in the histories of Enron and Andersen as “old sins cast 
long shadows”, another trope that can be observed is “there is 
nothing new under the sun”. This trope underpins the following 
comments of Skeel [2005, p. 188]: 
The most glaring flaw in the current framework – a flaw 
which is so long-standing that it is almost invariably ig-
nored in proposals for change – is the fact that the com-
pany itself decides who its watchers will be.
The only way to address this fundamental flaw, according to 
Skeel, “would be to take the choice of auditor out of the com-
pany’s hands” [2005, p. 188]. Berenson [2004, p. 227] projects 
a similar sentiment on change in general by entitling his after-
word “The more things change”.
Squires et al. [2003, p. 161] refer to an unspecified point of 
time in future where the demise of Andersen will be a “footnote 
in public accounting history”. This future point in time is likely 
to be many decades away, if not into the 22nd century. Until that 
unknown time, the failure of Andersen and the implications of 
the firm’s failure for the professionalization of accounting are 
likely to remain not a footnote but a substantial chapter in pub-
lic accounting history [Carnegie, 2005a].
CONCLUSIONS
The authors of the 12 books examined in this study draw 
very little on the academic accounting history literature. Many 
of them do not even address the historical development of ac-
counting, preferring to focus on the actors and events of “the 
now”, involving an almost exclusive reliance on press stories 
and internet sources. Of the authors who paid some attention 
to providing a historical background to the calamitous events of 
the early 2000s, none referred to the vast literature on the sociol-
ogy of the professions, including the many contributions on the 
14
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professionalization of accounting, or to the literature on critical 
accounting generally. This is unfortunate, as critical accounting 
history often focuses on topics of broad public concern, while 
regarding apparently technical aspects such as the history of 
double-entry bookkeeping as somewhat boring. Various general 
histories on accounting written by US scholars were evidently 
known to only a small number of these authors, notably Brew-
ster [2003] and Berenson [2004]. Of these general histories, 
Previts and Merino [1998] seemed to be the most widely-used. It 
is not surprising that lay historians tend to refer to books rather 
than scholarly articles, since books such as official or popular 
histories of the accounting profession and firms may probably 
be found in major generalist libraries. Articles may be more ac-
cessible than ever before to university-based researchers, thanks 
to on-line archives offered by journal publishers and organiza-
tions such as JSTOR (www.jstor.org), but those outside the acad-
emy may find them difficult and expensive to access.
The books written for a popular readership that we have 
examined in this paper are usually well-written, and some of 
the authors have attempted to base their writings at least on 
secondary sources grounded in extensive scholarly research. 
Some books cover long periods of time using broad narrative 
story-telling, combined with a focus on specific details that cast 
the overall story into perspective. These are the characteristics 
that we have already identified as generic to popular history. 
Emphasizing key characters such as Pacioli and Andersen hu-
manizes the narratives, but paradoxically makes the “popular 
histories” more like “elite histories” of “great men of the past”. 
Popular histories tend to stress “agency” over “structure”, and 
popular histories of accounting are no exception. Some of the 
books provide appropriate references for their sources but oth-
ers do not, so it is difficult to tell whether authors are aware of 
scholarly material but have chosen to ignore it, or whether they 
are simply not aware of the available scholarly literature on 
accounting’s past. Berenson [2004] at least, by his own admis-
sion, appears to fall in the latter category. Curiously, however, 
Berenson and Toffler are cited by Staubus [2005] in a critical 
analysis of ethical failures in corporate financial reporting in 
the USA. Prominent reference to these commercial books within 
the scholarly literature may imply an importance and authority 
going beyond the depth of historical research that typically un-
derpins them. 
What are the lessons for accounting historians? The most 
important is that there is a demand for popular history, and if 
15
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accounting historians do not respond to this demand, then the 
void will be filled by journalists, mouthpieces of firms and pro-
fessional bodies, and “amateur historians”. All of these may do 
a good job of propounding the standard narrative: “Luca Pacioli 
to Arthur Andersen in one quick leap”. But they are likely to lack 
the depth of knowledge and critical appreciation that a special-
ist historian of accounting will bring to the exposition of history. 
However, such specialists must be aware that different media 
demand different styles of exposition. As Champion [2003, p. 
167] notes: “If there is too much detail the programme becomes 
too dense for the audience to engage with. Oftentimes this sort 
of scholarly density is exactly what academic historians aim at: 
it is profoundly out of kilter with the requirements of televisual 
production.” It is painful for scholars to have to digest decades 
of learning into a few hundred words, but this may be necessary 
for communicating aspects of accounting’s history to a wider 
audience.9 Opportunities to contribute to different media should 
not be shunned – it is gratifying that several academic historians 
of accounting participated in the BBC Radio 4 series A Brief His-
tory of Double-Entry Bookkeeping produced by Jolyon Jenkins in 
2010. An accounting academic who is often able to bring histori-
cal aspects of accounting’s development to a wider audience is 
Prem Sikka, who regularly contributes on-line to The Guardian’s 
“Comment is Free” web-site [Sikka, 2008].
In several countries, the reward structure for academics 
tends to give little if any credit to popular engagement, with 
those who write for newspapers and magazines or appear on 
the radio or television (to say nothing of those who are active 
users of the internet and social media) often accused of “dumb-
ing down” at the same time as “making a show of themselves”. 
Academic historians of accounting are certainly not immune 
from such pressures. However, universities are also increasingly 
recognizing the efforts of their academic staff to engage with the 
public more broadly, with government-sponsored research as-
sessments increasingly investigating public as well as scholarly 
impact. As Cole [2012] notes, “much important and fascinating 
research is unavailable to the public simply because the discov-
erers lack the will or the talent to reach beyond their familiar 
9  One of the authors was asked recently to comment on the omission of any 
mention of double-entry from a recent BBC series Andrew Marr’s History of the 
World, broadcast in 2012, and his two paragraphs of comment at http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/magazine-19662059 were probably read by more people than all his 
academic publications that year.
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circle.” The books that we have studied in this paper show that 
there is a public interest in accounting and its history – it is up 
to the growing number of researchers specializing in the history 
of accounting to take on the challenge of disseminating our find-
ings not just in scholarly articles but to a broad public audience.
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